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Abstract
Organizations have and will continue to face threats and crisis from a number of sources.
We study trust from a contingency theory framework and hypothesize that trust levels vary
depending on different organizational designs. Using data from the laboratory experimentation
tool ELICIT, a multiplayer simulation, we examine the effect of trust levels and organizational
design on performance. We find that trust and organizational design have strong interactions and
that hierarchical organizations experience performance levels well below flexible organizational
structures. We offer implications for managers who are responsible for identifying and responding
to threat and crises.
KEYWORDS: trustworthiness, contingency theory, organizational structure, crisis management
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1. INTRODUCTION
For organizations owning the responsibility to detect and respond to impending 
threats, and for organizations facing crisis, trust among organization members and 
the organization’s structure represent critical considerations for expeditious and 
accurate threat  assessment. The present study  explores the relationship between 
structure and trust in the context of organizations dealing with imminent threat. 
 We address two questions organizational leaders interested in homeland 
security and threat assessment ought to consider: (1) What is the optimal 
organization design to maximize trust and increase performance? and (2) To what 
extent might organizational managers influence structural design and trust levels 
to improve responses to crisis?      
Using the contingency theory  of organizations (Donaldson, 2001), and 
research on organizations facing disruptive situations (Powley, 2009), we examine 
the impact of trust in different organizational forms to understand ways to 
organize most  effectively. We begin with a discussion of crisis, then review the 
literature on  trust and contingency theory of organizations. We used a web-based 
simulation of a counterterrorism environment (ELICIT) to test three hypotheses 
about the effects of trust levels and organizational design on performance. The 




Crisis is a function of system dynamics, contextual factors, time, and available 
resources when organizations face known or unknown threats such as war, 
terrorism, or stressful decision-making environments. Mishra’s (1996) framework 
for crisis describes dynamics with which organizational systems must contend and 
the required adaptational responses for organizations and institutions due to 
disrupted social interactions: “A crisis is defined to be (a) a major threat to system 
survival with (b) little time to respond, (c) involving an ill-structured situation, 
and (d) where resources are inadequate to cope with the situation" (Mishra, 1996, 
p. 262). Crisis calls into question survival of the organizational system, which has 
either positive or negative organizational outcomes particularly  when stakes are 
high and near flawless decision making is required (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). 
Outcomes depend on the behaviors of organizational members and are contingent 
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on communication sharing, trust, and organizational structures that either fetter or 
facilitate information flows. 
2.2. Trust 
Trust is a relevant construct in the context of threat assessment due to the 
vulnerability and risk associated with working with others in the context of 
critical and uncertain situations. Fundamentally, trust is based on risk and 
vulnerability in the context of social relationships (Lewicki, et al., 1998), and is 
most salient in the interaction between two (or more) people (Zand, 1972; 
Schoorman, et al., 2007) because both parties share a willingness to be vulnerable 
to each other’s actions (Mayer, et al., 1995). Trust is seen as a primary lubricant of 
organizations (Gambetta, 1988) and has received wide attention in the 
organizational sciences (Mayer, et al., 1995; Schoorman, et al., 2007). That said, 
the trust literature tends to be strong on conceptualization and somewhat weak in 
empirical work (McEvily, et al., 2003). 
 Trust  research implicitly assumes that  organizational managers should 
organize work to foster higher levels of trust (Bruhn, 2001; Nye, et  al., 1997; 
PEW, 1996), and organizational leaders are to some extent responsible for 
developing trustworthiness within their organizations based on their determination 
of optimal organizational performance. Trust among coworkers and between 
workers and managers may enhance efficiency by reducing the need for 
governance (Van de Ven, 2004), improve organizational performance (Zolin & 
Hinds, 2004), and affect psychological contracts (Robinson, 1996). With the 
involvement in high-pressure situations such as threat assessments, organizational 
leaders must share critical information and collaborate with other organizational 
members thus requiring trust in others. The propensity of individuals to share 
information and collaborate depends on the degree of trust organization members 
have in and toward each other. Mutual trust in colleagues’ propensity to share 
information therefore affords them confidence in organizational decision makers 
and operators. Positive appraisals based on the probability  that another will follow 
through or cooperate may enhance future probability  of cooperation (Nooteboom, 
et al., 1997), whereas the perception of withholding information demonstrates 
untrusting behavior and leads to spiraling low levels of trust and increased 
information withholding (Butler, 1995). In this sense, trust in organizations may 
neutralize or decrease because parties may reduce the risk and vulnerability 
associated with sharing information.
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2.3. Contingency Theory of Organizations 
A contingency perspective of organizations (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 
1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) suggests that there is no single, best approach to 
organizing in all circumstances. Indeed, organization and management scholars 
have come to understand well how various organizational forms are and should be 
designed and changed to fit specific contingency contexts (Creed & Miles, 1996). 
Definitions of structure differ based on a number of attributes (Davis, et al., 
2009), yet they all underline the idea that organizational managers have freedom 
to design work activities with more or less structure. 
 Similarly, a contingency perspective assumes (1) organizations are not 
entirely  open systems but are bounded systems, (2) stability within the system is 
essential, and (3) an organization’s design is a function of managerial decision 
making (Bidwell & Kasarda, 1985). In this sense, organizations are control 
systems and management’s main task is to maintain stability and order as 
managers adapt their organization’s structure to environmental challenges and 
make decisions as they assess threats. 
 According to Kramer (1996), the hierarchy, as an organizational form, 
remains one of the most prevalent structures found in contemporary  organizations. 
But hierarchies consist of relationships that are unequal in power or status, 
presenting an interesting arena in which to examine trust among organizational 
members (Kramer & Cook, 2004). While the hierarchy structure has been the 
typical bureaucratic structure (Grey & Garsten, 2001), the post-bureaucratic trend 
indicates that flexible, network organizations “capitalize upon fully connected, 
geographically disbursed, organizational participants by moving knowledge and 
power to the edges of organizations” (Leweling & Nissen, 2007, p. 1.). 
3. HYPOTHESIS 
3.1. Structure and Performance
Less bureaucratic, flexible, and adaptable organizational structures are designed 
more for both frequent and abrupt change than for control and stable performance. 
Several examples illustrate this point. Tushman and O’Reilly  (1999) discuss 
ambidextrous organizations, which are able to operate simultaneously in multiple 
modes. Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) discuss robust transformation, through 
which an organization seeks to develop responsiveness, flexibility, and an 
expanded action repertoire as opposed to seeking high levels of fit. Alberts and 
Hayes (2003) emphasize agility  across multiple, unpredictable environments, as 
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opposed to current or adaptive performance in any  specific contingency  context. 
Finally, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) suggest  that organizational semi-structures, 
capable of balancing order and flexibility, provide a superior approach to highly 
dynamic environments. 
Preferable are steady, stable environments to achieve optimal 
coordination, but they lack agility due to the high formalization of rules and 
procedures (Grey  & Garsten, 2001; Burns & Stalker, 1961). In situations of 
complex dynamics and decisions, hierarchy  may limit performance. Flexible 
organizational structures allow organization members the freedom to innovate 
their own internal, informal structures placing a premium on self-organization 
such that organization members in these flexible structural arrangements, 
regardless of trustworthiness, will perform better than those in organizational 
structures that limit interaction and require continuous communication through a 
hierarchy. 
Hypothesis 1: Organizational performance will be better in a flexible 
organizational structure than in a hierarchical structure. 
3.2. Trust and Performance
The trust literature offers support for high trust levels enhancing performance and 
higher levels of trust are associated with cooperation and higher effectiveness 
(Butler, 1995). Higher performance may be determined by trust among managers 
of an organization, since level of trustworthiness is what will ultimately govern 
the strategic actions of the organization overall (Schoorman, et al., 2007), and 
trustworthiness among co-workers can positively affect organizational 
performance (Zolin & Hinds, 2004). Zand (1972) showed that a high level of trust 
relates to positive performance, satisfaction, timely and accurate information, and 
overall confidence in others. Persons who trust each other “will provide relevant, 
comprehensive, accurate, and timely information, and thereby contribute realistic 
data for problem-solving efforts” (p. 231).
Hypothesis 2. Organizational performance under conditions of high trust 
will be greater than under conditions of low trust. 
3.3. Trust, Structure, and Performance
Trust is as an important aspect of organizational design which functions as a 
general control mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) primarily because the 
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emergence of less bureaucratic organizational forms has made trust a more central 
issue in organizational theory  (Grey & Garsten, 2001). A shift in organizational 
design, toward a more flexible organizational structure and away from a 
traditional top-down hierarchical form results in higher quality and productivity 
(Banker, et al., 1996). Moreover, flexible arrangements are dependent on high 
levels of trust (Creed & Miles, 1996) and highly centralized organizations are less 
likely to foster trustworthiness than flexible organizational structures (Whitner, et 
al., 1998). 
 Weick and Roberts’ (1993) examination of flight deck crews aboard 
aircraft carriers emphasizes the trust required for what they term the “collective 
mind”—individuals working simultaneously and collectively to complete critical 
tasks. Absence of trust in these situations poses a risk and potential life and death 
consequences. In Grey and Garsten’s (2001) view, trust acts as one mechanism to 
hold organizations together, particularly in more flat, flexible, networked 
organizational structures; that is, trust is necessary to enable organizing when 
organizations lack traditional hierarchical mechanisms. Indeed, trust may be a 
“more appropriate mechanism for controlling organizational life” than hierarchies 
or bureaucracies (Sydow, 1998, p. 31), and that without trust, “alternative 
organizational forms cannot be sustained” (Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996, p. 142). 
We expect the effect of trust therefore, will depend on organizational design, and 
its performance effects will be stronger in flexible organizations than in 
hierarchical organizational structures. 
Hypothesis 3. Organizational structure and trust will interact in such a 
way that a flexible organizational structure with high levels of trust will 
have higher performance than hierarchical organizations with high levels 
of trust.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
Building upon prior experimentation (Leweling & Nissen, 2007), we conducted a 
laboratory experiment with 136 graduate students to simulate a threat assessment 
situation using the ELICIT1  multiplayer intelligence game. The simulation 
methodology is ideal when empirical data are challenging to obtain in the field 
(Davis, et al., 2007), particularly in crisis situations. The laboratory simulation 
1  ELICIT, short for Experimental Laboratory for Investigation of Collaboration, Information-
sharing, and Trust, was designed and sponsored by the CCRP (Command and Control Research 
Program; www.dodccrp.org).
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also afforded experimental controls such as specific organizational rules, 
procedures, and structural relationships difficult to assure in the field. 
4.1. ELICIT Environment
ELICIT is a multiplayer game where participants perform the roles of 
organizational decision-makers to collaborate—in a networked, information-
processing environment—and identify  a fictitious terrorist  plot. Participants play 
the simulation through a web-based application. Participants learn about the plot 
through a set of informational clues, similar in design to the Parker Brothers’ 
board game CLUE®. As in the board game, the simulation requires players to 
analyze multiple pieces of information and combine assessments with other 
players to identify key aspects of the terrorist plot. Each clue describes some 
aspect of the plot, but none is sufficient to answer all of the pertinent questions 
such as who will execute the attack, what is the target to be attacked, where will 
the attack take place, or when will the attack take place. Moreover, no single 
player receives sufficient information to solve the problem individually, and 
collectively players cannot solve the problem until after the application distributes 
all of the informational clues. 
The application randomly assigns participants to roles in the simulation 
and automatically  distributes the informational clues among the players in a series 
of steps: each player receives two pieces of information initially, followed by one 
after five minutes of play and another after ten minutes. To be successful, players 
must collaborate, which is a requirement for a minimum of ten minutes. Evidence 
from previous experiments though (e.g., Ruddy, 2006) suggests that play requires 
substantially more time. Our participants played for approximately 50 minutes.
This experiment is an ideal way to test conditions associated with threat 
assessments of crisis situations. Several important elements are at  play during the 
simulation. First, the experiment simulates a terrorist attack; and yet even though 
fictitious, such events fit the definition of imminent disruption and crisis. Second, 
time pressure is evident. Organization members dealing with threats in the real 
world face deadlines and time critical situations to avert attacks. The simulation 
places participants in a time pressure situation as they are told to complete the 
simulation expeditiously and accurately. Third, as is often the case in practice, 
information is known or revealed piecemeal, and the specifics of the situation are 
unfamiliar. Individual participants in the simulation receive information over time 
and may not have full understanding of the situation until much later.
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High Trust - Flexible Organization
    17 participants
Low Trust - Flexible Organization
    17 participants
High Trust - Hierarchical Organization
    17 participants
Low Trust - Hierarchical Organization
    17 participants
4.2. Participants
The participants represent in part the kinds of relatively  well-educated and 
experienced people who deal with these types of highly critical and time-intense 
situations. Graduate students enrolled in a core organizational behavior course at a 
major university participated in our study as part of their class requirement. 
Participants were primarily male (86 %). All students were military officers or 
government employees from both the United States and other allied countries. 
The majority  were represented by the Navy (56 %) and Marines (20 %), whose 
ranks ranged from first level officers (O-1) to Commander or Lt. Colonel (O-5), 
with the majority (54 %) at the Lieutenant or Captain level (O-3). All players had 
undergraduate college degrees, and had worked professionally  in military  or 
government organizations.  
4.3. Simulation Design and Manipulations
We randomly  assigned students to one of four conditions (Figure 1), and we ran 
each of the four conditions twice for a total of eight simulation exercises; each 
exercise had 17 student participants (34 per condition, 136 total participants). 
Students arrived at the computer lab at their designated experiment time and were 
provided customized written instructions. The written instructions served as the 
primary method to manipulate the laboratory  conditions for both organization 
type and trust. Participants received information about the organization design and 
what to expect from other players. We manipulated trust level directly through 
instructional cues, described below. In both high and low trust conditions, verbal 
instructions were geared to establish a positive or negative assessment of trust 
among the participants rather than toward the experimenters.
Figure 1. Simulation Design
  
4.3.1. Trust
To induce trust, we used three components of trust (Mayer, et al., 1995): (1) 
competence, or a sense of efficacy to meet  expectations; (2) integrity, or the belief 
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that one is honest and open; can be counted on; and (3) benevolence, or the belief 
that one has a responsibility to look out for others and not to take advantage of 
another. In the high trust condition, we conveyed to participants verbally and 
through written communications confidence in their ability, “Your intellect, 
varying skills, and past experience lead us to believe that you are well qualified to 
solve the terrorist threat problem.” As for benevolence as a trust component, we 
said, “Members of your community share information freely  with a general 
orientation toward doing good to others. We are impressed with this orientation 
and are encouraged by the positive interactions among your fellow cohort 
members.” We induced integrity when we said, “Your actions will be consistent, 
congruent, and credible with established protocols and guidelines.”
 For the low trust condition we attempted to raise the level of suspicion 
among organizational members. We questioned and doubted their ability or 
competence with the verbal suggestion, “We have yet to assess your intellect and 
skills, and wonder whether past experience qualifies you to solve the terrorist 
threat problem as a group.” In terms of benevolence, instructions indicated the 
following: “Members of your community normally work well together but 
frequently withhold information from each other,” “we question whether negative 
interactions have affected your relationships,” and “previous sessions reveal that 
some individuals take pride in undermining team cohesion and effectiveness by 
generating and releasing false information or by non-participation in the 
exercise.” Finally, we showed our dismay at their integrity when we said, “We are 
discouraged that when it comes to solving critical problems in group settings such 
as this that your actions may not be consistent, congruent, and credible with 
established protocols and guidelines. Simply  put, be wary of moles and free-
riders.”
4.3.2. Hierarchical and Flexible Organization Structures
In the hierarchical organization structure, there were three stratified, functional 
levels. The senior leader was responsible for the intelligence organization as a 
whole and had four team leaders reporting directly. The most senior participant 
(highest in rank) in each experimental group  played the role of the senior leader in 
the hierarchy; this reinforced the concept of hierarchy  and strengthened a 
condition of centralization. Each team leader in turn had three team members 
reporting directly and was responsible for one set of details associated with the 
terrorist plot (e.g., who, what, where, when).
 As for the flexible structural form, there were no predefined hierarchical 
levels or functional areas; rather, the organization was intended to be more flat 
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and flexible, and all participants were free to work on any  aspects of the problem, 
i.e., who, what, where, and when. We also did not define a senior leader with more 
or less responsibility or information than any of the other participants. 
4.4. Performance Measures
Following Leweling and Nissen (2007), we measure performance as a two-
dimensional dependent variable comprised of: (1) timeliness, the time to identify 
plot details, and (2) accuracy, a correct identification of plot details. In the first 
component, timeliness pertains to how long it  takes a player to submit his or her 
identification of the terrorist plot details. For ease of comparison, we normalized 
the scale for the timeliness measurement across all conditions to a 0-1 scale based 
on the time it took participants to identify the plot, with 1 being more desirable. 
The second component of performance, accuracy, refers to the quality of 
the identification of the impending terrorist attack. Each participant’s identify 
action is scored with a value of 1 for each correct answer to the who, what, where, 
and when aspect of the solution. We divided the resulting sum by four for each 
element of the accuracy score. A player who correctly  identified all components 
received a score of 1.
4.5. Manipulation Refinements
To refine our manipulations, prior to the full study we ran a pilot experiment with 
individuals similar to those who participated in the study. Our conversations with 
them regarding the instructions helped us to fine tune the trustworthiness 
manipulations. Their inside, cultural and linguistic knowledge of our sample 
enabled them to suggest ways to strengthen, for example, the language for the 
trustworthiness manipulation to ensure that we would or would not induce a 
trustworthy condition. 
 Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine differences across the 
two-day period we conducted the simulation, we checked differences of mean 
scores from day 1 and day 2. This allowed us to see via the performance measures 
whether the trust manipulations were perceived similarly for both days. We found 
that in terms of accuracy there was no significant difference; for timeliness 
however, we found that day 2 was slightly  faster with marginal significance at the 
p > 0.1 level; as a result, timeliness scores were standardized across both days. 
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5. RESULTS
As hypothesized, results indicate that flexible organizations engaged in threat 
assessment dealing with complex decisions in the context of crisis perform better 
than hierarchies (Hypothesis 1: organization type manipulation is significant at 
the 0.05-level, F=3.082, sig. 0.049). Additionally, organizations with high levels 
of trustworthiness show better performance than organizations characterized by 
low trust (Hypothesis 2: trustworthiness manipulation is significant at the 0.1-
level, F=2.407, sig. 0.094).
 Based on these results, when we examine performance measures (accuracy 
and timeliness) independently we find some interesting results about trust and 
organization structure. We looked at how timeliness and accuracy vary separately 
across our manipulations through a series of factorial ANOVA calculations. The 
results reveal that  taken independently the main effects (organization type and 
trust condition) are not significant. The interaction effect of organization type and 
trustworthiness for both outcome measures, however, are highly significant, (p < 
0.001) in support of Hypothesis 3.
For a given level of trustworthiness, timeliness across the organization 
type manipulation and timeliness across the trustworthiness manipulation for a 
given organization type does not appear to vary much, though the interaction 
effect for timeliness is significant (Figure 2). In terms of timeliness, flexible 
organizational structures characterized by higher levels of trustworthiness perform 
better than hierarchies. 
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What we find interesting and counterintuitive is that when the level of 
trustworthiness is low, the hierarchy outperforms the flexible organization in 
terms of timeliness. It is as though the hierarchy  enables participants in a low 
trustworthiness environment to work comparatively  more quickly than in the 
flexible organization structure. Consistent with prior theory  and research, when 
the level of trustworthiness is high, the flexible structure outperforms the 
hierarchy. This finding suggests that when trustworthiness is high, the flexible 
organization structure enables participants to work much more quickly than in the 
hierarchy. Moreover, the flexible organization in the high trustworthiness 
condition produces the highest overall performance in terms of timeliness.
In terms of accurate assessment of the threat situation, like the analysis for 
timeliness, the interaction of organization type and trustworthiness is strong; 
however, unlike the analysis above, in which neither main effect is significant, 
both the organization type and trustworthiness condition have strong effects on 
performance in terms of accuracy (Figure 3). When the level of trustworthiness is 
low, there is negligible performance differential between organizational types. 
Moreover, both organization types perform similarly when low trustworthiness is 
present. Alternatively, when the level of trustworthiness is high, the flexible 
organization structure outperforms the hierarchy. Looking at both timeliness and 
accuracy  together, the flexible organization type and high trustworthiness 
condition produces the highest overall performance. 
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6. DISCUSSION
The results presented here provide important insights for organizational managers 
who must assess potential threats. Our findings support the idea that flexible 
organizational structures are more desirable than hierarchical structures 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). Based on the results from this empirical study, we 
believe that trust is contingent on organizational design and that design is 
dependent on trust among organizational members. We begin with some of our 
observations of the results and offer suggestions to managers or those who intend 
to improve organizational performance in a threat assessment environment. We 
also discuss implications for research and suggest opportunities for practice. 
6.1. Implications for Homeland Security Practitioners
This study speaks to those in organizations making threat assessments for  their 
leaders facing disruption and crisis. The establishment of trust becomes an 
important foundation and based on the results of this study, an organization’s 
design will affect  its performance during critical situations. We suggest that 
organizations whose core mission is to deal with threat may benefit  from more 
open cross-functional and less hierarchical organizational forms. Regardless, 
organizations ought to tap into and capitalize on informal, social networks. 
Moreover, managers in such organizations ought to develop and promote trust. 
We offer several implications for managers who face crisis and threat.
6.1.1. Performance in Flexible Organizations Is Superior When Trust Is High
Performance in the flexible organization structure is very sensitive to 
trustworthiness. Results show that flexible organizations with high 
trustworthiness perform better than any other configuration examined in this 
experimentation. If high trustworthiness is present or can be developed in an 
organization, then a flexible form is superior to the hierarchy in terms of both 
accuracy  and timeliness. It appears as though the free information exchange and 
limited structure combine to produce high performance irrespective of trust 
(Hypothesis 1), but particularly when organizational members trust one another 
(Hypothesis 3). Alternatively, performance of the flexible organization structure in 
conditions of low trustworthiness is much worse. It appears as though low 
trustworthiness negates the performance advantages available through a flexible 
structural design. Where organizational managers have the benefit of high trust 
levels in the organization, they should strive to create or maintain flexible 
structures forms. Likewise, where organizational managers have created flexible 
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organizational structures, they must work diligently to establish and maintain 
those high trust levels.
6.1.2. Performance in Hierarchical Organizations Is Independent of Trust
In contrast, performance in an organization with a traditional hierarchy  is 
comparatively  insensitive to trust, particularly  where accuracy is measured. If low 
trustworthiness is present, possible, or cannot be overcome in an organization, 
then the hierarchy form is superior to the flexible structure in terms of both 
timeliness and accuracy. Accurate performance in the hierarchy is nearly identical 
in high trustworthiness versus low trust conditions. The situation is even more 
pronounced when timeliness is the dependent variable. Hierarchy  performance in 
terms of timeliness is greater in low trust than in high trust conditions. This 
finding may be due to the nature of critical decision making under time pressure.
Structured organizations with low trust may  not slow down to consider the 
problem, but rather use the strengths inherent in clear reporting structures to work 
quickly. In situations of low trustworthiness or suspicion, performance may be 
suspect. Fein (1996) found that possibilities of deception or suspicious behavior 
might lead individuals to be more cautious (and perhaps more careful) in decision 
making thus slowing down their judgment processes. This has both positive and 
negative consequences. On the one hand, a calculated approach may mean better 
decision quality, but on the other hand, when time is of essence, suspicion may 
short change the decision making process particularly in the flexible organization 
structure. Both quality and time are elements of performance in critical high 
pressure, ambiguous and uncertain situations (see Lawless, et al., 2007), such as 
major crisis incidents. 
6.1.3. Hierarchical Organizations Are More Efficient
Where managers of organizations dealing with threat assessment do not have the 
benefit of high trust levels in the organization, they should strive to create or 
maintain hierarchy forms, for they offer the greatest level of safety. Our results 
suggest that the rules and constraints imposed by  the hierarchy are sufficiently 
effective to overcome negative performance impacts associated with conditions of 
low trustworthiness. It appears also as though such rules and constraints are at 
inherent odds with high trustworthiness environments. Based on finding about 
timeliness, because hierarchies have standard reporting structures, and efficiency-
gains through established rules and processes, they have a tendency to process 
information faster than organizations without formalized communication 
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channels. Relatively  flexible, unstructured organizations may take more time 
building rapport and thus invest more time working on the problems of the 
impending crisis.
6.1.4. Trust and Structure Interact to Impact Performance
A design and managerial tradeoff exists between organizational performance and 
safety. As outlined above, where high trustworthiness is present or can be 
developed, the flexible organization delivers the highest performance, but where 
low trustworthiness is present, possible, or cannot be overcome, the hierarchy is 
exposed to the least risk in terms of performance degradation. Consistent with 
Davis and colleagues (2009), organizational managers must assess the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of flexible and hierarchical structural forms given 
high or low levels of trustworthiness. From a contingency theory perspective, 
neither organizational form is superior across both trustworthiness levels. Optimal 
levels of structure and trust ought to be the goal.
6.1.5. Efforts to Promote Trust in Hierarchy May Be Futile
Quite distinct from the flexible structure described above, in which developing 
and maintaining high trustworthiness levels is vital, efforts to promote high trust 
levels in the hierarchy may be futile. In terms of timeliness, the hierarchy 
performs worse in conditions of high trustworthiness than with low 
trustworthiness, and in terms of accuracy, trust has negligible influence over 
performance. This implication is likely to be very controversial: it suggests that 
organizational managers in the hierarchy should not concern themselves with 
promoting trustworthiness—particularly when dealing with challenges. Trust may 
be inherent  in the structural relationships and therefore expending energy to 
develop trust may not be beneficial. Such implications require additional 
investigation, as there are likely to be other, important factors affecting the results.
6.1.6. Combination of Organizational Design and Trust Is Key
Organizational managers should understand the strong interaction effects 
identified through this study. It is insufficient to design an organization as either a 
flexible organization or a hierarchy because performance is dependent upon the 
trust conditions. Likewise, it is insufficient to promote either high or low 
trustworthiness because performance is dependent upon the organizational design. 
Hence the combination of organizational design and trustworthiness level is key. 
Flexible organizations characterized by  trustworthiness produce the best overall 
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performance but exhibit  greater risk in terms of performance degradation where 
high trust cannot be assured. Hierarchy organizations produce better performance 
where low trust exists and represent safer forms where high trust cannot be 
assured. Organizational managers are called to pursue both design and trust 
changes in organizations to enhance and maintain performance while limiting 
risk. This provides a potentially  important contribution to contingency  theory: 
explicit and directional linkages between organizational form and trust conditions.
Whereas our study dichotomizes organizational structure, there are likely 
optimal levels of structure organization managers ought to develop  (Davis, et al., 
2009). In crisis situations that seemingly  require strong direction and trust may 
very well benefit from fewer structural constraints and the development of trust to 
achieve the best performance results. 
6.1.7. Organization Design Shifts during Crisis 
In this study, we conceptualized organization design and trust as relatively stable 
constructs, yet we recognize that these are much more dynamic in crisis contexts. 
When crisis occurs, day-to-day  operations characterized by flexible lateral and 
horizontal coordination give way to structured relations to ensure proper handling 
of the crisis event. Emergent hierarchies within responding organizations allow 
for clarity  and efficiency, and as presented here, enable expeditious decision 
making, although this may come at the expense of accuracy. 
Likewise, within organizations facing the crisis, crisis interrupts 
organizational routines and functioning and other organizational forms are likely 
to emerge as well. Social statuses within the organization are altered, and in some 
cases, disrupted altogether with the loss of ineffective leadership. Such changes 
may prove to be the undoing of organizational operations in the midst of a 
disaster. 
Trust  may be established in either the responding organization or in the 
organization facing threat. When it is, trust is likely to function within the 
hierarchy to enable effective responses. On the other hand, lack of trust may 
emerge in crisis when organizational leaders make missteps that impact 
functioning and overall perceptions. The dynamic nature of organizations in 
practice suggest that regardless of form, trust ought to be developed and fostered 
among organization members.
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7. CONCLUSION
Organizations have and will continue face threats and crisis from a number of 
sources. This research has highlighted implications of trustworthiness and 
structure for dealing with impending crisis. Due to its importance in 
organizations, substantial research on trustworthiness either assumes or argues 
that organizational managers should always establish trust. We have argued here 
that trust levels are an important organizational contingency factor, and 
contingency  theory suggests that different organizational designs may be 
comparatively more or less appropriate for different levels of trustworthiness.
 Results from our study suggest that trustworthiness and organizational 
design have strong interactions where high levels of trust are not always necessary 
for good performance. Consistent with contingency theory, neither organizational 
form is superior across all trust levels. Results reveal also a substantial penalty for 
organizations with hierarchical structure that impede the benefits of high 
trustworthiness. Controversial results suggest that efforts to promote high 
trustworthiness in the hierarchy may be futile. In either case, results indicate that 
both organizational design and trustworthiness are important to performance and 
that neither is sufficient alone.
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